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ARTICLE

u.s. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
UNDER G. W. BUSH
ARMIN ROSENCRANZ·

I. INTRODUCTION
During the fIrst three months of 2001, there were two startling developments in climate change policy. In January, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (lPCC) reported
unequivocally that the world's climate is warming and that
anthropogenic sources - mostly burning coal, oil and gas to
produce electricity - are at least partially responsible l • In
March, his second month as U.S. President, George W. Bush
both reversed his earlier position on regulating domestic emissions of C02 and repudiated the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. The
Kyoto Protocol was fashioned at the third Conference of Parties
(COP) to the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC), held in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997. Its purpose
was to implement the goals of the FCCC and had been a signal
accomplishment of the Clinton-Gore administration. President
Clinton signed it in 1998. 2
There is no way to reconcile these two developments. The
IPCC 2001 report offered the considered assessment of the
AB, Princeton; JD, PhD, Stanford; Consulting Professor, Stanford University;
Adjunct Professor of Law, Golden Gate University; Co-editor (with Stephen Schneider
and John-O. Niles) of Climate Change Policy: A Survey (Island Press, 2002).
1
IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) Synthesis Report (Apr. 2001) at
http://www.ipcc.chl.
2 Shardul Agrawala and Steinar Andresen, U.S. Climate Policy: Evolution and
Future Prospects, ENERGY AND ENv'T, Summer 2001, at 126.
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overwhelming majority of the world's climate scientists, and
President George W. Bush's reversal and repudiation seemed a
head-in-the-sand response driven by ignorance, shortsightedness and the interests of certain elements of the American business community.
In this short article, I review the development of U.S. climate change and energy policy under President George W.
Bush, describe various executive branch initiatives to address
the issue of global climate change, and assess the prospects for
progressive U.S. action to address climate change over the remainder of the Bush Presidency. This is a short article because
the repudiation of Kyoto speaks for itself and the domestic initiatives that could arguably influence greenhouse gas abatement seem extraordinarily modest in scope and cost.
II. COP-6 AT THE HAGUE
Between COP-4 in Buenos Aires in November 1998 and
COP-6 in The Hague in November 2000, significant domestic
opposition to emission cuts developed in corporate circles and
in Congress. Since it became clear that an emissions trading
system would take many years to be realized, the only alternative to lifestyle-changing cuts in carbon emissions was for U.S.
negotiators at COP-6 to seek credits for carbon sinks in U.S.
agriculture and forestry practices. 3 The European Union (E. U.)
insisted that at least half of industrialized countries' reduction

3 [d. at 123. David Sandalow, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Environment and Science, and Head of the U.S. delegation at COP-6 in The Hague, said in his
opening statement to the Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Hague, The Netherlands, November
13,2000:
The United States will work with all Parties to craft sound decisions that include:
• Strong, market-based rules for the flexible mechanisms;
• Binding legal consequences for failure to meet targets;
• Rules that recognize the role of forest and farmlands in fighting climate
change;
• A prompt start to the Clean Development Mechanism, with rules to ensure its
workable operation and environmental integrity;
• Help to provide the technology and capacity [that] developing countries need
to combat climatic change and adapt to its impacts.
[Emphasis added) (speech on file with the author). See also D.B Sandalow and I.A.
Bowles, Climate Change: Fundamentals of Treaty-making on Climate Change, SCI.,
June 8, 2001, at 1839-40.
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targets be achieved through domestic cuts in fossil fuel emissions. 4 It seemed at one point in the negotiations that the gap
between the E.U and U.S. positions could be bridged. But the
E.u. delegates, perhaps under pressure from their Green Party
members and environmental Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), eventually refused to bridge this gap and COP-6 ended
without agreement. Since George W. Bush was declared president-elect in the three weeks following the end of COP-6, it
seemed to many observers that the gap between the E.U. and
the U.S. would likely widen in the future. 5

III. THE GEORGE W. BUSH FIRST HUNDRED DAYS
The historical moment seemed ripe for Republican presidential leadership, in the tradition of President Nixon going to
China: Vice President Gore, who championed the "global warming" issue in his 1992 bestseller, Earth in the Balance, and who
had been the lightning rod for congressional opposition to carbon abatement since 1993, was off the public stage, and Republicans seemed poised to co-opt this issue and divide his supporters. Several industry leaders, including CEOs of oil companies, had announced that global climate change was here to
stay and needed to be taken seriously. Several large corporations' reluctant to appear regressive on the issue of climate
change, had left the Global Climate Coalition - the industry
lobby that had been so vocal in opposition to an international
climate agreement for most of the 1990s. The IPCC had just
predicted a global temperature rise as high as 60 C in the 21 at
Century unless greenhouse gas emissions are reduced. Seizing
the moment to announce progressive, market-based carbon dioxide policies would seem to have been the safest political
course, with the possibility of reducing the usual swing to the
opposition party in the 2002 midterms elections, and helping to
secure President Bush's reelection in 2004.

• See Hotting Up in The Hague, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2000, at 83.
5
Argwala, supra note 2, at124. Beyond these EU/uS divisions, Agrawala and
Andresen argue that American "national culture" influences the shape of climate
change policy: "There is unlikely to be domestic support for measures that seemingly
enhance government control over citizen behavior. This sentiment has played a major
role in the U.S. insistence on flexible, market based approaches, as opposed to more
top-down measures ... supported by most European countries." [d. at 133.
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Notwithstanding this apparent opportunity, President
Bush wrote on March 13, 2001 to four Republican Senators
that he was not willing to regulate C02 emissions in light of the
ongoing California energy shortage and "the incomplete state of
scientific knowledge of the causes of, and solutions to, global
warming change, and the lack of commercially available technologies for removing and storing carbon dioxide."6
Sixteen days later, the second shoe dropped when President Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol by stating he would
not accept a plan that will harm our economy and hurt American workers. 7
IV. REACTION TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S MARCH, 2001
PRONOUNCEMENTS

Most environmental NGOs deplored President Bush's
March 2001 pronouncements on global climate change. One
typical response came from the Union of Concerned Scientists
(UCS):
The president cited two reasons for his decision, both of which
are ill founded, and without merit.
The first is that he does not believe the evidence of global
warming is clear. Nothing could be further from the truth. A
panel of the world's leading scientists recently released the
most comprehensive study ever on global warming, and found
that it is well underway, will have devastating impacts if
emissions go unchecked, and can be limited at little or no net
economic cost.
The second is that including caps on carbon dioxide emissions
will significantly increase electricity costs for the nation's
consumers. His claim is based on a fatally flawed study
commissioned by former Representative David McIntosh, a
hard-line opponent of action on global warming. Other recent
analyses by the Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency and private groups demonstrate that major

• Letter from President George W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and
Roberts (Mar. 13, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov Inewslrleasesl2001/03
120010314.html.
7 President George W. Bush, Press briefing at The White House (Mar. 29, 2001).
See also Rage Over Global Warming, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2001, at 18.
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reductions in power plants' pollutants including carbon dioxide can be achieved at modest cost. 8

The DCS e-mail to its supporters goes on to explore "solutions to deflate soaring electricity prices," including presidential support of clean energy sources and energy efficiency
measures to reduce demand. DCS noted that wind energy is
the fastest growing energy supply in the world. 9 It is hard to
comprehend President Bush's political strategy in these March
2001 reversals. Whereas conservatives and the business community make up perhaps 20 percent of the electorate,10 polls
indicate that a large majority of Americans of both major parties consistently favor protecting the environment and conserving open spaces. l1 Conservatives and business people may be
more deeply committed to their beliefs than environmentallyminded people are to theirs, but the political calculations of the
Bush team still seem to risk a backlash from voters in 2002
and 2004.
To defuse the negative public reaction to his reputation of
Kyoto, as well as his apparent reneging on a campaign pledge
to regulate C02 emissions, President Bush on May 11, 2001,
called for guidance on climate change policy from America's
most highly regarded scientific body, the politically neutral National Academy of Sciences (NAS).12 The NAS organized an
expert panel that, within four weeks, concluded, "[g]reenhouse
gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of
human activities ... Human-induced warming and associated
sea level rises are expected to continue throughout the 2pt
Century."13 The NAS expert committee went on to endorse the
IPCC January 2001 report's main conclusions, and praised
IPCC Working GrouP's "admirable summary of research activi8
E-mail from Lloyd Ritter, Union of Concerned Scientists, to the Union of Concerned Scientists mailing list (Mar. 20, 2001) (on file with author).
• Id.
ID
To be sure, this twenty percent of the electorate may represent eighty percent or
more of the country's wealth.
II
Jean Cumming & John Harwood, Arsenic Issue May Poison Bush's 'Compassionate Conservatism', WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2001, at 16. In an April 2001 CBS poll, 61
percent of respondents said that protecting the environment was more important to
them than producing energy. Id. Only 29 percent chose energy over the environment.
Id.
12
Burning Bush, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 16,2001, at 77.
13
Id.
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ties in climate science."14 If President Bush expected the NAS
group to be skeptical of climate change and to hamletize about
scientific uncertainty, he must have been disappointed.
Besides calling for help from the NAS, President Bush announced his intentions to set up a U.S. Climate Change Research Initiative to study areas of scientific uncertainty and
develop priority areas for investment. 15 He also announced his
support for a National Climate Change Technology Initiative
centered in universities and national laboratories. 16 These initiatives got President Bush little credit, especially since they
appear likely to be modestly funded - as have all U.S. climate
change initiatives in the last ten years.
V. KyOTO REDUX
Stanford Senior Fellow David Victor has argued that the
Kyoto targets were arbitrary and hopelessly unrealistic."17 The
Economist believes that Bush's formal repudiation of Kyoto
contains some good news and some bad news. IS The bad news
is that (a) President Bush has retrogressed by alleging continued uncertainties about the science of climate change, in the
face of an overwhelming consensus among climate scientists
that global warming and its damaging effects are real and are
caused by human activity; and (b) President Bush's team has
argued that developing countries are not required to cut carbon
emissions and thus get a free ride while developed countries
like the U.S. suffer economic 10ss,19 But developing countries'
per capita carbon emissions are now a small fraction of per capita emissions in the U.S. and other developed countries; the
developed countries' emissions account for the bulk of the
greenhouse effect, so it is fair that they act first; and all climate
negotiations envision a carbon emission role for developing
countries at a later stage. 20
The good news, according to The Economist, is that the
Bush people are focusing on the costs of complying with Kyoto
14

to
16
17

18

19

20

[d.
President George W. Bush, Press Briefing at the White House (Jun. 11, 2001).
[d.
VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, 27-29 (2001).
See Oh no, Kyoto, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 7,2001, at 73-75.
[d. at 74.
[d.
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targets. An international climate change treaty could be implemented in a flexible way that gives broad play to market
forces and encourages innovation and development of clean
technologies. Europeans seem to be unreasonably skeptical of
market approaches, and the Bush repudiation may get them to
rethink their position. The Economist cited with approval Victor's argument that the cause of the Kyoto Protocol's collapse is
its "cap and trade system," which allows ambitious targets but
puts no limits on compliance costS. 21
VI. THE DOMESTIC POLICIES: BUSH-CHENEY ENERGY PLAN

Both President Bush and Vice President Cheney are former Texas oil men. That seems about as good an explanation
as any for the regressiveness of their "energy security" plan.
According to the National Energy Policy, the federal government can reduce fossil fuel use, improve energy efficiency, develop renewable energy supplies, reduce gasoline consumption
in the U.S. transportation sector - half of the U.S. oil supply
from all sources is consumed by vehicles - and switch from coal
or oil to natural gas without building a diversified energy System. 22
The Bush-Cheney energy plan only addresses the last of
these five strategies. It focuses on expanding the supply of
natural gas. There may have been an unsavory connection between Vice President Cheney and Enron, which had been the
world's largest natural gas supplier until it filed for bankruptcy
in October 2001. 23 Enron was a top contributor to the BushCheney campaign in 2000. The plan would open one to two
mostly gas-fired power plants each week for several years, and
make the U.S. far more dependent on natural gas than it ever
was on oil. 24
It seems fairly clear that Bush and Cheney are serving
their own business community. The suggestion that more drilling within the U.S. will reduce America's dependence on for21

[d. at 75.

22

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

REpORT OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY

DEVELOPMENT GROUP, (May 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/.
23
Tom Hamburger, Six Meetings Cited Between Enron Corporation and Officials of
the Bush Energy Task Force, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9,2002, at A4.
.. Antonia v. Herzog et al., Renewable Energy: A Viable Choice, ENV'T, Dec. 2001,
at 12.
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eign oil is bogus. Saudi Arabia has enormous resources of oil
that can be extracted at a lower cost than oil anywhere else in
the world. This oil will, inevitably, flow onto the world market
and set the world price, regardless of U.S. policies. 25
The Bush-Cheney energy plan would open federal lands,
including Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, to oil and
gas exploration. It would promote the construction of oil refineries, power plants and oil and gas pipelines. It calls for subsidies for coal and nuclear power and for rolling back environmental standards. 26 It is hard to see how any of this promotes
energy security or serves the national interest.
VII. OTHER U.S. DOMESTIC ACTIONS AND PROPOSALS WITH
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS

On January 9, 2002, the Bush administration announced
that it was abandoning the Clinton administration's Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles, on which the government has spent an annual average of $200 million over the past
seven years. This program sought to create an 80-mile-pergallon American car. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said
that U.S. car manufacturers could not build such a vehicle at
an affordable cost27 - despite the presence in the U.S. market of
Honda and Toyota hybrid (gasoline and electric-powered) cars
with mileage per gallon approaching the 80 m.p.g. target.
Abraham announced a new program called Freedom Cooperative Automatic Research ("Freedom Car") whose aim is to develop sport utility vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells. 28
The Bush administration seems to have no interest in tougher
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, much less
in reducing overall motor vehicle use. It seems to prefer to cut
sweetheart deals with the U.S. auto industry - continuing the
Clinton Policy in that respect, but with a supposedly more realistic goal that, in Secretary Abraham's words, doesn't sacrifice
"freedom of mobility and freedom of choice."29
.. See Addicted to Oil, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2001, at 9.
,. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Regulators Urge Easing of Rules for Clean Air, N. Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at AI.
'r1

Bush Shifts Gears on Car·Research Priority , WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2002, at C14.

,. [d.
29 [d.
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If the U.S. is to seriously embrace hydrogen fuel cells, the
challenges of hydrogen storage and distribution will have to be
met. The low energy density of gaseous hydrogen makes it difficult to store in a vehicle. If hydrogen is to be used to power
vehicles, it must be stored either as a compressed gas or as a
liquid at extremely cold temperatures (-253°C). These extreme
temperature and pressure conditions mean that hydrogen will
require a new distributional infrastructure. Also, the costs of
storing cold liquefied hydrogen are currently prohibitively
high.30
Four senators last year proposed a modest bill that would
mandate that the fuel economy of light trucks match car fuel
economy by 2007. 31 Democrats Dianne Feinstein of California,
Jack Reed of Rhode Island, and Charles Schumer of New York,
and republicans Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins of Maine
sponsored this bill. The proposed increase in fuel economy
would supposedly save an estimated million barrels of oil per
day and prevent 240 million tons of carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere. 32 This bill seems to have been eclipsed by
the war on terrorism and has gone nowhere.
Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-CT.) and John McCain (RAZ.) also announced last August their intention to introduce
domestic cap-and-rule legislation, which "will ... enable us to
negotiate an acceptable international agreement ... when the
U.S. does come back to the table."33 Lieberman chairs the Senate Governmental Mfairs Committee, which voted out a bill on
August 1, 2001, to create a new White House Office on Climate
Change, responsible for developing, coordinating and implementing a national strategy on global climate change. 34
At about the same time, The Washington Post reported
that executives of several large utilities believe that carbon

Seth Dunn, Hydrogen Futures, Toward a Sustainable Energy System,
Aug. 2001, at 36-37.
3.
Senators Feinstein and Snowe, release to the press, May 1, 2001, available at
http://feinstein.senate.goy/releasesOllcafe_standards.html.
32
[d.
33
Senators Leiberman and McCain, press statement, Aug. 3, 2001, available at
http://www.senate.goY/-liebermanlpresslO 1I0S/200 1S03920.html.
34
Senator Leiberman, press statement, Aug. 1, 2001, available at http://www. senate.goY/-gOY_affairs/OSO 10 l_press.htm.
30

WORLDWATCH PAPER 157,
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dioxide regulation is inevitable. They want and need to be
guided by clear national regulatory policy on C02 emissions. 35
In the wake of COP-7's endorsement of Kyoto's targets, the
Economist reported on two initiatives by business lobbies. The
GHG Protocol, developed by the World Resources Institute and
the World Business Council on Sustainable Development whose members include Ford and Dupont - establishes an
international standard under which businesses report their
GHG emissions. 36 The Emissions Market Development Group
announced its intention to create a new "commodity for international trading of greenhouse-gas reductions."37
The Pew Center on Global Change has also organized a
"Business Environmental Leadership Council," whose members
include IBM, Boeing, BP, Hewlett/Packard, Dupont and InteL
This Council argues that U.S. businesses should take concrete
steps now to reduce carbon emissions. 38
VIII. THE FEBRUARY, 2002 BUSH CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGY
On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced his long
awaited strategy to address climate change. His target is to
cut the rate of annual domestic carbon emissions through voluntary corporate action from 183 metric tons per million dollars of GDP to 151 metric tones by 2012.39 His aim is to slow
the growth of emissions rather than reducing them - thereby
avoiding harm to the U.S. economy. He talked of cutting
greenhouse gas "intensity" by eighteen percent over the next
decade. The eighteen percent cut is not a cut in emissions but
rather a cut in the level of emissions per unit of economic output. 40 Growth in economic output between 2002 and 2012 make
it likely that U.S. carbon emissions would be significantly
higher in 2012 than they are today.

,. Eric Pianin, Bush Urged to Negotiate Global Warming Treaty, WASH. POST, Aug.
2, 2001, at A14.
36
Gasometry, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17,2001, at 69.
37
Id.
36
Business Environmental Leadership Council, mission statement <http://www.
pewclimate.org/beldindex.cfm >. See also Geoff Winestock, Effort to Cut Greenhouse
Gases Percolates on Back Burner, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at A14.
39
John J. Fialka, Bush to Unveil Plan Linking Economy and Environment, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at A22.
'" Blowing Smoke, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16,2002, at 27.
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The Bush climate change strategy included a proposed $4.6
billion in tax credits over five years, averaging $900 million per
year, to stimulate investments in clean energy sources, hybrid
and fuel cell vehicles and emissions reducing technologies. 41
Notwithstanding much talk by Bush administration officials
and the Council of Economic Advisers about market based initiatives, there is nothing in the new strategy about carbon
emissions trading - one of the flexibility mechanisms of the
Kyoto Protocol contributed by the U.S. delegation to COP-3 in
1997.
The President said his 2003 budget commits $4.5 billion to
climatic change, "more than any other nation's commitment in
the entire world."42 This includes $588 million toward energy
conservation research and development (R + D), $408 toward
renewable energy R + D,and $150 million for the new Department of Energy "Freedom Car Initiative." 43
President Bush observed that, under the Kyoto Protocol,
the U.S. would have had to "make deep and immediate cuts in
our economy to meet an arbitrary target." It would have cost
our economy up to $400 billion and we would have lost 4.9 million jobs."44 He also noted that "developing countries such as
China and India already account for a majority of the world's
greenhouse gas emissions,"45 but failed to acknowledge that
China and India together contain 2.3 billion people and produce
fewer carbon emissions than the U.S. with 280 million people.
President Bush's budget allocations to address climate
change are on the same order and roughly the same tiny percentage of GDP that President Clinton allocated. Like the
Bush-Cheney energy policy, there is scant emphasis in the new
climate change strategy on energy conservation, renewable energy or fuel efficiency standards. An editorial in the New York
Times concluded that President Bush does not regard global
warming as a problem: "[t]here seems no other way to interpret
a policy that would actually increase the gases responsible for
.. President George W. Bush, Address at The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, (Feb. 14, 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/20021
02l20020214-5.html.
42

[d .

.. [d.

.. [d.
'" [d.
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heating the earth's atmosphere ... By his own figures, actual
emissions ... could rise by 14 percent, which is exactly the rate
at which they have been rising for the last 10 years."46
Senator James Jeffords (Ind., VT), chair of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, described the Bush
climate change strategy as "divorced from the reality of global
warming".47 Environmentalists must now appeal to Congress,
where they seek legislation to require corporations to publicly
disclose their carbon emissions - in contrast to the voluntary
disclosure advocated by President Bush.

IX. PROGNOSIS
The declaration that the Kyoto Protocol is dead seems
premature, in light of its adoption by 178 nations in Bonn in
July 2001 and reaffirmed at COP-7 in Marrakech in November
2001. Benefiting from the international shock over President
Bush's withdrawal from the Kyoto negotiating process, the
E.U. went along with massive compromises in November 2001
(COP-7) that they wouldn't consider in November 2000, at
COP-6. In the wake of Bush's repudiation, the E.U. was willing to accept a partial deal rather than a continued stalemate.
Thus, U.S. policy has had a major, though obviously unintended, influence over the entire climate change negotiation.
Prior to September 11, 2001, pressure was building on all
sides - Congress, industry and environmental groups - to
take action on climate change and to develop an international
alternative to Kyoto. Now, notwithstanding the war on terrorism, the rest of the world has moved forward with concerted
international action on climate change without U.S. involvement. Americas' allies may reasonably expect a less unilateral48 and more cooperative role in climate change in view of
their support of U.S. anti-terrorism measures.
President Bush may have calculated that responding to international pressure on the climate change issue will lose
rather than gain him domestic support. The major challenge
'" Backward on Global Warming, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,2002, at A18 .
., Bush Plan Deepens Divide Over Kyoto Protocol, NATURE, Feb 21, 2002, at 82l.
'" Climate change isn't the only case of unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. In the
last year, the Bush administration also revoked President Clinton's endorsement of the
International Criminal Court and cast aside the nuclear test ban treaty.
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ahead seems to be for Congress and the business community to
persuade the Bush administration to act much more forcefully
to reduce carbon dioxide domestically and to collaborate in
shaping carbon reduction policies, strategies, and mechanisms
with fellow member states of the FCCC, all sharing the same
carbon-loaded atmosphere, and most allied with the United
States in its war on terrorism. This, together with flexible
market-based mechanisms developed in tandem with Bush policy advisors, and with growing pressure from Democrats, scientists, and environmentalists, could bring the U.S. back into the
process.
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